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Kurmo Konsa
TIME AND SPACE OF HERITAGE 
PRESERVATION: CONSERVATION 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
As human beings, we simultaneously live in a physically existing 
environment and the cultural image of the same environment. On 
the one hand, we have direct physical contact with the environment; 
on the other hand, it is also mediated and cultural. Our existence 
in the world is one of the cornerstones of our humanity. What 
combine in the world are both the actual environment that is the 
foundation of our existence and the discourse that people have 
constructed of it. Time and space are the two main categories of 
the physical existence of humans, but not only that: treatments of 
time and space make up one of the most significant parts of the 
deep structure of culture. We ourselves are positioned in time and 
space, and the background to all of our thoughts and feelings is also 
time and space. Preservation is the maintenance of meanings and 
values. Upon attempting to connect meanings and values to time 
and space, it seems that meanings tend to be more spatial and values 
more temporal. Meanings are related to space; in another word, 
the environment. According to biosemioticians, the emergence of 
meaning is related to the emergence of life. Before life emerged on 
planet Earth, there were no meanings present; these slowly started to 
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in space related to heritage, I will use the terms “artificialisation” 
and “heritage technology”. This is not an attempt to present the 
history of how time and space have been treated in conservation and 
restoration; instead, I will focus on more significant theoretical key 
points and use them to characterise the importance of these terms 
for the field of heritage.
CREATING HERITAGE SPACE THROUGH TECHNOLOGY
The two largest metaphors around which we create a network in 
order to make our life meaningful are nature and culture. The world 
of heritage is located in the ambivalent fields of the natural and the 
cultural. Heritage space is created by people through the phenomena 
and objects that we call heritage. Creating heritage space is an activity 
belonging to the field of technology. In order to understand it, we 
need to start with culture.
The following is a discussion of culture in its wide anthropologic 
sense, meaning a way of life characteristic to groups of people. Culture 
in this wider sense is unquestionably a vital condition for the existence 
of human species. Culture is a phenomenon unique to humans, 
although culture has not emerged solely with the development of 
humans. However, while other animal species might also have their 
own protocultures, Homo sapiens is nevertheless the only species 
whose cultural transmission is stable enough for coevolution with 
a genetic heredity system. Culture is quite clearly the key element 
that distinguishes us from other organisms to a significant extent, 
enabling us to share knowledge among ourselves and pass it on to our 
descendants. The extremely adaptable and flexible human nervous 
system is, on the one hand, conditioned by the artificial environment 
surrounding us; on the other hand, however, it is vital in order to 
create such an environment. The emergence of such a reciprocal 
influence cycle has been the foundation of the development of the 
human species. The creature that we call a thinking human being is 
made up of the synergy of the physical human body (especially the 
nervous system), culture, and the environment; whereas the tools and 
technologies used by people are simultaneously the result and the 
determining factors of our human activity. The complicated nervous 
system that uses the transmission system of biological and genetic 
information inevitably needs to combine with culture. Unless we have 
appear as life developed.1 In such a general sense we can understand 
meanings as the employment of environmental differences by living 
organisms. The actual explosion of the meaningful world took place 
with the emergence of the modern human, of course. Meanings 
seem to accumulate and gather; values, however, tend to emerge 
and disperse.
Although time and space make up the main categories of our 
world, their relationship to cultural heritage and its preservation 
have often been left out of theoretical discussions. According to Juhan 
Maiste, “the task of heritage conservation is not merely to speak of 
matter nor ideas but rather of both of them; instead of empty space, 
we should speak of filled space where something is happening at 
each and every moment; where the instinctual desire to preserve 
ourselves is also related to the overwhelming desire in ourselves 
to go on, to create something new instead of what we have already 
lived, to build bridges between tradition and innovation. And yet, the 
task of heritage conservation is mostly not to create time and space, 
not even to ask overly complicated questions about them.”2 I think 
it is the contrary: not only do we need to ask these complicated and 
contradictory questions, but we also need to understand that creating 
time and space is one of the main tasks and goals of preservation. 
In addition to the fact that heritage is inevitably located in time and 
space, preservation also directly needs to deal with shaping space 
and understanding time. Otherwise we fail to understand heritage, 
and to connect its preservation to the development of societies and 
the flow of understanding the world.
In this article I am treating the categories of time and space through 
heritage preservation. I am showing that heritage creation is also 
the creation of human time and space, and that critical treatment of 
heritage also requires a more precise distinction of these main terms. 
First I will look at how human space is created via objects, how the 
objects of physical environment become parts of our life and world 
– things. One can only change the world by understanding it. This 
is a fundamental truth which is the foundation to both common 
sense and complicated philosophies. In order to explain the changes 
1  See, e.g. Jesper Hoffmeyer, Biosemiotics: An examination into the Signs of Life (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 2009).
2  Juhan Maiste, “Aeg ruumis ja ruum ajas. Tagasi asjade juurde”, Aeg ja ruum. Uue 
muinsuskaitse poole, ed. by Anneli Randla (Tallinn: Eesti Kunstiakadeemia, 2009), 9–16, 10.
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abstract information, leaving the physical carrier aside. Examples 
of mentefacts are text, graphics, databases, music, etc. In fact, both 
aspects of culture are inseparably connected, and the distinction is 
needed mostly due to the differences of scientific disciplines, but 
also out of practical necessity.
a sufficiently complicated nervous system, we are unable to create 
and use culture. However, even the most complicated nervous system 
is useless with a lack of culture. As we can see, it is impossible to 
draw a distinction between a human being as a biological creature 
and a human being as a cultural creature. We are a complicated 
combination of both, and this is what makes us unique − at least 
among all the organisms inhabiting the planet Earth.
When a human being is born, they have no ready-made culture; 
however, neither is culture directly taken over from the environment 
one ends up in. Acquiring a culture also means changing and shaping 
the culture in interaction with a person’s biological development. 
As a person grows and develops, also culture is created, which 
grows and develops just as the biological human body and nervous 
system. Culture has come to be such that it is able to mutually interact 
with the human brain, and our brain has developed into being such 
that very different cultural features can stimulate it, triggering the 
recognition of certain features and patterns.
Different parts or fields have been distinguished in culture. One 
widely used distinction is the division of culture into material (i.e. 
tangible) and non-material (i.e. intangible) culture. The material 
culture can also be defined as “the sector of our physical environment 
that we modify through culturally determined behaviour”.3 This 
is a very broad definition including not only man-made objects 
(artefacts) but also the parts of the natural environment that people 
have changed according to their needs. On the one hand, a piece of 
rock collected by a geologist or insects captured by a biologist are 
natural objects; on the other hand, they are also artefacts, as they have 
been removed from their original context and are being preserved 
for scientific purposes (Fig. 1). Non-material culture is made up of 
values and beliefs, social norms, and all kinds of symbolic systems 
(language, numbers, and art). Non-material culture encompasses 
people’s thoughts and behaviour, their ideas, and all sorts of abstract 
entities − but also organisations and institutions. Sometimes, two 
types of artefacts are distinguished when discussing culture: material 
objects and non-material objects, i.e. mentefacts. Whereas material 
objects are concrete and perceptible objects, mentefacts refer to 
3  James Deetz, In Small Things Forgotten: An Archaeology of Early American Life (New 
York: Doubleday, 1996), 35–36.
Fig. 1. A leaf from the herbarium of vascular plants at the Natural History Museum at 
the University of Tartu. A plant removed from its natural environment and preserved 
in a museum or in a scientific institution becomes an artefact. Photo: Kurmo Konsa.
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being created right now allows societies to prevent the use of heritage 
in the justification and support of nationalism, separatism, and 
oppression. Heritage is not connected to the essential nature or past 
events of nations or groups of people. Heritage is a technology that we 
use nowadays to create the present and the past; it is dependent not 
only on the past but also on our current choices. Heritage is merely 
a tool; however, it should not be forgotten that it is a very powerful 
tool for making these choices and carrying out decisions. The fact 
that society’s functioning processes and structures are becoming 
increasingly complicated also has an effect on the field of heritage. 
Both recognising something as heritage and managing it has become 
a task of respective institutions and experts. However, the desire of 
individuals and communities to manage heritage in correspondence 
with their beliefs and goals has also strengthened.
Heritage is simultaneously a part of our physical reality, and a 
non-material phenomenon (Fig. 3). Heritage connects people to each 
other and the environment, both to its material and natural aspects, 
being therefore one part of our world. Based on our heritage, by 
re-creating heritage again and again and loading it with meanings 
important to them, people shape the way societies function. It is 
through heritage that meanings are created and values are presented 
to societies and to society at large. I categorise the heritage process 
as a broader technology, treating it as a specific technology through 
which people employ their past and implement it to meet their present 
needs. It is part of the process by which the world is becoming more 
artificial. The term “technology” has several definitions, as it is a 
complex phenomenon that is difficult to treat.
The most wide-spread view of technology is that of a collection of 
tools and machines. It is obviously too narrow a definition since it 
excludes all technologies that do not use tools. According to Lewis 
Mumford, the first tool in the world history was organisation, which 
allowed a huge number of people to come together to do some kind 
of work. He called this kind of social organisation a “megamachine”.4 
Different types of definitions consider technology via rules rather than 
tools. Jacques Ellul views the essence of technology as a behaviour 
4  Lewis Mumford, “The concept of the megamachine”, Philosophy of Technology: The 
Technological Condition, an Anthology, ed. by Robert C. Scharff, Val Dusek (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1996), 348–351.
When focusing on things surrounding people, what needs to be 
emphasised immediately is the importance of these things to people. 
Things are an important part of our world, of our lifeworld. We are 
connected to the world through things. We use them to express our 
thoughts and feelings. We think through them and with their help. 
There is a huge difference between a natural object and an item that 
has been paid attention to by a human being. In the human world, 
objects connected to meanings and values become things, some of 
which will in turn become heritage (Fig. 2).
People live in the world, but the world is to a large extent made by 
ourselves. We live in a mostly artificial environment filled with man-
made objects. These objects can be relatively simple, such as the chair 
I am sitting on, or highly complicated, like the computer on the desk 
in front of me. Things do not just emerge by themselves; technology 
is needed for that. Being a human is inseparably related to several 
tools, technologies, inventions, and activities. Technology connects 
our lives, identities, and activities; it also participates in the creation 
of our place in the world, and our identity. Living our cultural and 
social life as biological creatures in this world rearranged by people, 
it is important for us to recognise and be familiar with technology. 
This is all also directly related to heritage: heritage is a technology 
that has to be used as efficiently as possible to solve local and global 
problems of both contemporary and future societies.
Unless we do that, heritage will become unnecessary and disappear, 
at least in the sense developed at the end of the 18th century and used 
until now. The idea of heritage as a technology is related to the idea of 
heritage as a social construct. Treating heritage as a technology that is 
Fig. 2. Objects becoming things and heritage. Drawing by Peeter Laurits.
201200 Time and Space of Her iTage pr eServaTionKur mo KonSa
by blurring the line between technology and culture, the whole of 
culture and society are covered by the term “technology”. The third 
type of definition emphasises the vital importance of a human context 
for technology. By adding social organisation and human values 
to the definition of technology, the definition of a technological 
system could be as follows: “Technology is the systematic application 
of scientific or other organized knowledge to practical tasks by 
organized systems that involve people and machines.”7 Based on this 
definition of technology, in case of heritage process, we can speak of 
it as a specific technology. What is it then that heritage technology 
deals with? Technology is the main way for humankind to adapt to, 
and change, the environment. Technology itself and its influence 
on the environment are to a large extent intermediated by culture. 
Technology is one of main ways for human society to relate to the 
natural environment. In the words of Arthur McEvoy: “Technology 
is what distinguishes human activity in nature from that of other 
animals; because technology is a means of interacting with nature, 
however, it should be amenable to ecological analysis.”8 This kind 
of development has once again raised the issue of determining the 
relationship between technology and culture. Since technological 
systems are man-made, they undoubtedly also affect human society 
and culture. Several theories have been created to describe and 
explain this phenomenon; however, there are not many treatments 
that include culture, technology and the environment at the same 
time. Here we could mention Bruno Latour, who has criticised the 
distinction between nature and culture, claiming that man-made 
objects should be treated as “actants” and therefore as symmetrical 
to humans. According to Latour, the starting point for such analysis 
is the nature-culture hybrid.9 The actor-network theory created by 
Latour has also been used to discuss heritage.10 It seems to me that 
one of the most significant foundations of human existence is the 
fact that to live as a human being on this planet means changing this 
planet. To my mind, “artificialisation” is a fitting term to describe all 
7  Arnold Pacey, The Culture of Technology (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983), 6.
8  Arthur McEvoy, “Working Environments: an Ecological Approach to Industrial Health 
and Safety”, Technology and Culture. Supplement: Snapshots of a Discipline, 36 (1995), 150.
9  Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).
10  Rodney Harrison, Heritage: Critical Approaches (New York: Routledge, 2013), 31–35.
following certain norms.5 Psychologist Burrhus Frederic Skinner adds 
here interpersonal manipulations and behaviour management.6 The 
danger of such definitions is that they become too “comprehensive”: 
5  Jacques Ellul, “The Technological Society”, Philosophy of Technology: The Technological 
Condition, an Anthology, ed. by Robert C. Scharff, Val Dusek (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 182–186.
6  Burrhus Frederic Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Knopf, 1971).
Fig. 3. The iconostasis in the prayer house of the Raja congregation of the Old Believers. 
Heritage is simultaneously a part of our physical reality and a non-material phenomenon. 
Photo: Kurmo Konsa.
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these changes. By artificialisation, I understand an anthropogenic 
transformation of the environment that mainly takes place through 
the effect of a technological system. The environment hereby 
encompasses the physical, biological, and genetic life environment, 
as well as human culture, including its past. In this environment, it is 
impossible to distinguish between the human and the inhuman, since 
these make up one hybrid whole.11 The term “artificialisation” allows 
an easier crossing of the still-existing semiotic line, as Christina 
Ljungberg calls it, between nature and everything artificial.12 In 
terms of artificialisation, we are not speaking about a line but 
a complicated process. This term is not as politicised as are the 
categories of technology and nature. Of course, artificialisation does 
not imply any determined course of history; it is a human means 
of description, a metaphor to help explain the processes ongoing in 
nature and in human society. According to this treatment, heritage 
process would be one technology employed in the artificialisation 
of the environment.
TIME MODELS AND HERITAGE
The lives of objects are as complicated as those of human beings; 
objects change as people do. Although change is central to the 
conservation theory, it is also the concept that brings about the 
11  Jorge Canestri, “Some Questions on Virtual Reality and Psychoanalysis”, Challenges of 
Psychoanalysis in the 21st Century: Psychoanalysis, Health, Psychosexuality in the Era of Virtual 
Reality, ed. by José Guimón, Sara Zac de Filc (New York: Springer, 2001), 1–4.
12  Christina Ljungberg, “Wilderness from an Ecosemiotic Perspective”, Sign System Studies, 
29 (1) (2001), 169–186.
biggest doubts and ambiguous interpretations. The reason for this 
is very simple. After all, change is related to one of the basic concepts 
– time; and both physics and philosophy have a long way to go to 
find the exact definition of time. In the following discussion, I will 
use metaphysical theories of time as the background to treating the 
life course and damage of objects, and in the end, also conservation 
theories.13
The main metaphysical models of time are the presentist and 
eternalist models. According to the presentist model, there is nothing 
but the present and therefore, the past and the future are not real 
(Fig. 4). The model recognises the fact that time and changes are 
real and claims that everything that is real is only in the present. 
People live in an ever-changing present that changes into the past 
all the time and the future is constantly arriving but never here. 
Every point in time keeps moving from the future to the present 
and from there onwards to the past. The past does exist, of course, 
but only in people’s memories, just as the future can only exist in 
our imagination. The past is over, the future has not arrived yet, so 
the only thing that is real is the everlasting present. The present, 
the current moment, is very special according to this model as this 
is the only thing that is real; also, a person can directly sense only 
this moment. The objects and events that existed in the past are no 
longer real in the present.
The eternalist time model (Fig. 5) is static and according to this 
model, all events – the ones that are taking place in the present, the 
ones that took place sometime in the past, and those that will take 
13  An overview of time philosophy can be found in the following sources: Barry Dainton, Time 
and Space, Second Edition (London, New York: Routledge, 2010); Kristie Miller, “Presentism, 
Eternalism, and the Growing Block”, A Companion to the Philosophy of Time, ed. by Heather 
Dyke, Adrian Bardon (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 345–364.
Fig. 4. Presentist time model. The only thing that really exists is the present. Drawing 
by Peeter Laurits.
Fig. 5. Eternalist time model. Drawing by Peeter Laurits.
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need to be taken into consideration during restoration: the creation of 
the work; the period between completion of the work and the time it 
reaches the consciousness of an actual perceiver; and finally, existing 
in the consciousness of an actual perceiver of the work.15 Restoration 
can only take place in the final stage of the object. I have used the 
following model of the object life course. In the “biography” of an 
artefact, three states can be distinguished: the conceptual state, the 
factual state, and the current state. The life of an artefact always 
starts from an idea of the preparer, which is always related to the 
conceptual context of the preparer, i.e. a certain culture. There are 
no general artefacts; there are only artefacts from a specific culture, 
from a specific moment in time. Even the conceptual state of an 
artefact is itself a potential object that exists on the idea level. The 
following states of an artefact refer to an object that has already 
been realised. The factual state reflects the realised object straight 
after the end of the preparation process. In many cases, the factual 
state is merely a hypothetic construction, as the exact moment the 
object is ready is impossible to determine – the preparer can make 
changes to the object; the object might be left unfinished; someone 
else might finish the object, etc.
After preparation, the life of an object begins, over the course 
of which it is used, fixed, changed, etc. Most objects are destroyed 
after active use, some end up in landfill and some are recycled. As 
a general rule, the utilitarian value of an object diminishes due 
to physical, technological, and psychological obsoleting. Once an 
object loses its practical value, it is often thrown away or reused as 
raw material. A much more interesting scenario is one in which the 
aesthetic and symbolic value of an object increase, while its practical 
value decreases. For example, a utility object can be seen as a work 
of art, whereas both its meaning and function change.
An object’s informational structure changes during its “life” and 
the object reaches us in its current state. The current state includes the 
original information (primary data), but also the information it has 
acquired during its use, deterioration, conservation, etc. Importantly, 
an object in its factual state is not identical to the object at any later 
point in time. It can be the same painting or the same building, 
15  Cesare Brandi, Teoria del restauro (Turin: Einaudi, 2000), 21–27.
place in the future – have the exact same ontological status: they exist 
always. The events are located on the timeline in a specific order, 
although there are no dynamics of time. The relationships between 
events remain: as the discovery of America in 1492 happened before 
the foundation of the University of Tartu in the year 1632, then this 
is how it is, irrespective of the position from which we perceive 
the timeline. According to the eternalist theory, change means that 
at one unchangeable moment in time, events occur in a particular 
way; at another unchangeable moment of time, they are different. 
Objects and events are different at different moments, but there is 
no temporal changing between these moments. Events and objects 
exist on an eternal, unchangeable timeline. The fact that people use 
the terms “past”, “present”, and “future” is natural from a subjective 
perspective; however, objectively, there is no such thing. The model 
treats time similar to space: this is one dimension that can be used 
to describe the world; however, there is nothing special about this 
dimension.
Now let us see how these time models are related to the models 
and theories used for the preservation and conservation of objects. 
Firstly, let us look into how the life course of items is conceptualised. 
To describe the life course of objects, several models have been created 
but according to all of them, any object is the result of a historical 
process. To study these processes, a division into stages of different 
length usually takes place. This approach is used in history (the 
Stone Age, the Bronze Age, the Iron Age, ancient history, the Middle 
Ages, modern history, contemporary history); in the development of 
organisms (embryogenesis, juvenile stage, fertile period, ageing); in 
chronology (second, minute, hour, day, month, year, century). The 
history of the Earth is also divided into stages (eons, eras, periods, 
and epochs).
Several models of object life course have been presented. For 
instance, Barbara Applebaum distinguishes five stages in the life 
of an object: creation, original use, discard, collection, and museum 
acquisition in the collections of a memory institution.14 According 
to Cesare Brand, the famous 20th century conservation theoretician, 
there are three important periods in the life of a work of art, which 
14  Barbara Appelbaum, Conservation Treatment Methodology (Amsterdam, Boston, et al.: 
Butterworth-Heinemann, 2007), 123–124.
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but it is no longer a completely identical collection of physical and 
chemical properties, functions, meaning, and context.
Ageing is generally seen as the decrease of the information level. 
In fact, the informational value of an object might increase while 
it is ageing. Damage might add documentary value, as reflections 
of certain events; it may also add aesthetic value, such as patina, 
craquelure or the ageing of the lacquer layer on paintings. Functional 
properties of an object change just as the structural properties do.16
From the perspective of conservation, the changes taking place in 
objects are highly significant. Such changes are conditioned by the 
processes taking place in the objects. The processes can be grouped 
into physical, chemical, mechanical, and biological. These processes 
can be caused by several reasons, some of which are characteristic 
to the object itself (e.g. chemical composition, material structure, 
etc.), and some of which are external (e.g. temperature, humidity, 
biodamage, usage, vandalism, accidents, etc.). Changes can be 
apparent in the appearance of objects (darkening, fading, deformation, 
etc.), in the physical or mechanical properties of materials (change 
in weight, loss of flexibility, changes in transparency, etc.), or in 
the chemical composition (acidic paper, red rot of leather, metal 
corrosion, etc.). Different terms are used to describe changes: stains, 
soiling, mould, tears, holes, etc. Some changes are considered to be 
damage to objects. Which changes categorise as damage and which 
do not needs more specific determination. Generally, damage means 
any changes that are considered undesirable in a certain context. 
Therefore, changes are conditioned by objective processes: in the case 
of damage, these have been given a subjective judgment. Whether 
a change in an object is considered to be damage or not depends on 
cultural and political values.17
When speaking about object damage, a distinction must be drawn 
between the descriptive and normative levels. On a descriptive 
level, the changes that have taken place in the objects are described, 
and the reasons for these changes and the effect on the object are 
16  This process is discussed in depth by Michael Thompson in his book: Michael Thompson, 
Rubbish Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).
17  Appelbaum, Conservation Treatment Methodology; Jonathan Ashley-Smith, Definitions of 
Damage (1995). See: http://cool.conservation-us.org/byauth/ashley-smith/damage.html [viewed 
11.01.2017]; Kristel Van Camp, “Damage Atlas for Photographic materials”, CeROArt (2010). 
See: http://ceroart.revues.org/1770 [viewed 11.01.2017].
clarified, if possible. On the normative level, respective normative 
social terminology is used to estimate whether the given changes are 
harmful, neutral, or useful (Fig. 6). In general, damage is understood 
to be a decrease in the value of an object. There are two important 
conclusions drawn here: firstly, only changes cause damage; and 
secondly, only the changes that affect the object value negatively are 
damage. In other words, damage is a change in the object that has 
a negative effect: 1) on the condition and value of an object either 
as a whole or partly; 2) on the value of an object as a part of some 
collection; 3) on the usage of an object or a collection that the given 
object belongs to.
The condition of an object describes the general physical state of 
the object as it relates to object materials, construction, structure, 
appearance, measurements, and shape. The condition and state of an 
object as a whole can change, but change can also affect parts of the 
object. For instance, the value of the artistic binding of a book can 
fluctuate due to changes, while the text itself might be left completely 
intact. The types of changes that are considered to be damage depend 
as well on the value attributed to the object. With objects of higher 
value, smaller negative changes are considered damage in comparison 
to objects of lower value. The definition emphasises the objects’ 
potential inclusion in collections or other related integral wholes, 
as this may add significant value to an object that a single object 
does not possess Also, the usage of objects is important, as their 
preservation takes place so that they can be used now as well as in 
the future. Describing the changes to an object on the descriptive 
Fig. 6. Relations between changes and damages and differentiation between
descriptive and normative levels. Drawing by Peeter Laurits.
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level does not require the clarification of the object’s value nor the 
reasons for these changes. On the normative level, however, it is 
essential to ascertain the object’s value and assess the effect of the 
changes on that value. From the perspective of change, conservation 
is the intentional changing of an object, so that the value of the object 
will either stop decreasing or increase.
Now let us take a closer look at the object life course model in light 
of the metaphysical time models discussed above. From the presentist 
perspective, an object is actually existing and therefore important 
at the present moment. In the past, the object had many different 
states, regarding most of which we have no exact information; in the 
future, the object will also potentially have many different states. 
However, it is one and the same object over and over again, only 
at different moments of its history.  The condition of each object is 
integral and authentic, clearly distinguishable from all other states 
of the object existing at all other moments in time, yet still identical 
to them as it is one and the same object! This treatment is clearly 
problematic for determining the object’s identity and authenticity 
since an object is and is not simultaneously identical to its states at 
all other moments of time.
When looking at the object life course from the eternalist position, 
several interesting facts emerge. In the eternalist model, the object 
as a whole does not exist at a certain given moment, but in the time 
continuum as a whole, as it is being created until the moment of its 
destruction. Such an object can be imagined as a four-dimensional 
(three spatial dimensions and one temporal dimension) cylinder, 
each cut of which is the state of an object at specific moment in 
time and space (Fig. 5). All the states are equally real: the present 
state is in no way more special than a previous or a future state. 
The eternalist position emphasises the importance of the object as 
a whole, starting from the idea of its creation and ending with not 
even the destruction of the object, but with the disappearance of 
its last effects on the world. The eternalist treatment of time allows 
for the seeing of objects as wholes, taking into account what has 
happened to them before as well as the impact of current decisions 
and actions on the future states of an object (from our perspective). 
Therefore, our ethical responsibility to objects increases. Everything 
we do to objects remains forever and affects the objects, ourselves, 
the environment, and humankind on the whole.
What could the described metaphysical time models have in 
common with conservation theories? Upon closer inspection, it 
appears they have a lot in common, as both of them can be related 
to two almost archetypal approaches to heritage preservation: 
conservation and restoration. These antagonistic approaches are 
nowadays first and foremost connected to the names of Eugène 
Viollet-le-Duc and John Ruskin; however, in reality these ideas 
generate from a much later period and were connected to these men 
in hindsight. A public debate took place in the first half of the 19th 
century regarding the restoration or conservation (non-restoration) 
of medieval buildings.18
Eugène Viollet-le-Duc (1814–1879) is known for his interpretative 
approach to restoration, which the critics have called destructive. 
In his book Dictionnaire raissone de l´Architecture francaise du XI au 
XV siècle19 he defines restoration as follows: “The term restoration 
and the thing itself are both modern. To restore a building is not to 
preserve it, to repair, or rebuild it; it is to reinstate it in a condition 
of completeness which could never have existed at any given time.”20
By stating the modernity of restoration, Viollet-le-Duc refers 
to the fact that it did not exist as such before the 19th century. He 
underlines how special his contemporary time was as compared to 
previous human history: “It has undertaken to analyse the past, to 
compare and classify its phenomena, and to construct its veritable 
history, by following step by step the march, the progress, the 
successive phases of humanity.”21 He stresses the importance of an 
analytical study of each building; both from the material and non-
material perspective. Since only a few buildings were built within 
a finite period of time, especially during medieval times, they had 
many different alternations and additions. Moreover, buildings 
18  See, e.g. Nicolaus Pevsner, Ruskin and Viollet-le-Duc: Englishness and Frenchness in the 
Appreciation of Gothic Architecture (London: Thames and Hudson, 1969).
19  Eugène Viollet-le-Duc, Dictionnaire raisonné de l’architecture française du XIe au XVIe siècle 
(Paris: A. Morel, 1854–1868). He speaks of restoration in 8th volume. See: https://fr.wikisource.
org/wiki/Dictionnaire_raisonn%C3%A9_de_l%E2%80%99architecture_fran%C3%A7aise_du_
XIe_au_XVIe_si%C3%A8cle [viewed 11.01.2017]. English translation: Eugène Viollet-le-Duc, 
On Restoration (London: Sampson Low, Marston Low, and Searle, 1875). See: https://ia902708.
us.archive.org/8/items/onrestorationby00wethgoog/onrestorationby00wethgoog.pdf [viewed 
11.01.2017].
20  Viollet-le-Duc, On Restoration, 9.
21  Ibidem, 13.
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were complemented and changed even after they were finished. 
Therefore, stylistic restoration of buildings implied a critical study 
of buildings: “It is therefore essential, previous to every work of 
repair, to ascertain exactly the age and character of each part, – to 
form a kind of specification based on trustworthy records, either by 
written description or by graphical representation.”22 Also, buildings 
were of different styles in different regions. Therefore, the architect 
had to be familiar with regional variations of the different styles 
and schools. Based on the study of a building, the architect had to 
decide how to restore the building. It is the present that matters 
when decisions regarding a monument are made – in which style 
it was built, and what the perfect embodiment of that style on the 
building would be. The most perfect state of an object is its original 
state. Wear and damage deform and distort the object; the duty of 
the conserver is to release the object from the desolation of time. He 
developed his approach as far as claiming that the original state of 
the object was not when it was completed, but rather when it was 
ready as an idea. For Viollet-le-Duc, the most important thing was 
the conceptual shape of an object. The aim of restoration was to 
reconstruct the “ideal original state” of a building, the way in which 
the object would have been planned and constructed under ideal 
circumstances at a specific moment in time. According to this model, 
the history of a building can be comprehended by reconstructing a 
series of objects that correspond to the consecutive developmental 
stages of the building.23 The authenticity of a building can only be 
judged at the present moment.24 However, he also found it important 
to take into account the specific characteristics and changes made 
in later use. An object that inevitably only exists in the present was 
restored so that it would correspond to a specific moment in time. 
This approach corresponds to a variation of the presentist time model 
called the “growing block” model. According to this, the constantly 
growing past, and the present moment as the constantly growing 
edge, are real. The model includes the past and the present; however, 
22  Viollet-le-Duc, On Restoration, 36.
23 Thordis Arrhenius, The Fragile Monument– On Conservation and Modernity (London: 
Artifice Books, 2012), 63–64.
24  Aaron Vinegar, “Viollet-le-Duc and Restoration on the Future Anterior”, Future Anterior, 
3 (2) (2006), 55–65.
the future is not included. The block is constantly growing from the 
past towards the future (Fig. 7).
In the middle of the 19th century, there was a growing criticism of 
restoration that often led to arbitrary updates, and reconstructions 
that ignored historic reality. One of the leading figures of this 
perspective was John Ruskin (1819–1900), who did not create any 
conservation theories as such, but many of his viewpoints form 
the foundation of contemporary conservation philosophy. In his 
work The Seven Lamps of Architecture, he thoroughly discussed the 
features and values of architecture. He protected the authenticity 
of historic architecture in every way, stressing the value and beauty 
of old buildings: “For, indeed, the greatest glory of a building is not 
in its stones, nor in its gold. Its glory is in its Age, and in that deep 
sense of voicefulness, of stern watching, of mysterious sympathy, 
nay, even of approval or condemnation, which we feel in walls that 
have long been washed by the passing waves of humanity.”25
In his uttermost love for everything old, Ruskin went so far as to 
claim that nothing new should disturb old buildings. Old damaged 
buildings should not be reconstructed or restored; everything should 
be left the way it has reached us: “We have no right whatever to touch 
them. They are not ours. They belong partly to those who built them, 
and partly to all the generations of mankind who are to follow us.”26 
25  John Ruskin, The Seven Lamps of Architecture (London: The Waverley Book Company, 
n.d.), 195. See: https://ia802307.us.archive.org/27/items/1920sevenlampsof00ruskuoft/1920se
venlampsof00ruskuoft.pdf [viewed 11.01.2017].
26  Ibidem, 206.
Fig. 6. Relations between changes and damages and differentiation between
descriptive and normative levels. Drawing by Peeter Laurits.
213212 Time and Space of Her iTage pr eServaTionKur mo KonSa
observation of changes and, if needed, also directing such changes. 
It is not an attempt to “freeze” objects and phenomena in time by 
keeping them the same through history. Making observations and 
attributing meanings to something are complicated activities that 
require different approaches and methods. The idea of directing 
changes means that there is no attempt to achieve a certain outcome; 
instead, it is a constant process that is monitored and managed. The 
environment is constantly changing. The result of changes that have 
taken place in the past is the present environment, and the changes 
taking place today shape the future environment in turn.
When considering previous changes to be part of an object’s history, 
it follows that the changes taking place right now are a part of that 
history as well. However, people have the ability to decelerate certain 
changes and accelerate others, depending on set goals. The decisions 
made in the preservation process of heritage need to be guided by 
values inherent to heritage. Preservation should be such that the 
values and meanings characteristic of heritage remain. At the same 
time, it should not be left unnoticed that when making preservation-
related decisions, certain values need to be preferred over others.
Preservation is a part of the heritage management process; the 
way this process is carried out is also important. The main problem 
of contemporary preservation has clearly shifted from the question 
of “how” to the questions of “what” and “why”. When preserving 
objects, places and phenomena, it is important to clearly state the 
values and reasons upon which the decision to preserve something 
has been made. Discussing heritage by using the term “technology” 
stresses the most important facet of the heritage process: the fact 
that it creates values and meanings in a culture. By creating and 
managing heritage, we inevitably deal with the most important 
processes in society.
The central problem of conservation and restoration is the question 
of the authenticity of objects. By applying the metaphysical time 
models used in the philosophy of time, I showed the possibility of 
determining authenticity in a different way. The essential difference 
between the conservation theories discussed here lies in their 
attitudes toward time, and the related problems of object authenticity 
and identity. In the framework of the presentist model, it is not 
possible to solve the main contradiction connected to restoration. 
Stylistic restoration ruined the authenticity of buildings as historic 
Naturally, he found restoration as an activity to be completely wrong: 
“Neither by the public, nor by those who have the care of public 
monuments, is the true meaning of the word restoration understood. 
It means the most total destruction which a building can suffer: a 
destruction out of which no remnants can be gathered: a destruction 
accompanied with false description of the thing destroyed.”27
For Ruskin, the traces of history on an object are the greatest 
value of the object. The authenticity of a building does not lie in 
its historic form but in the traces that time has left on the building. 
These form part of the object and without them the object would be 
something completely different, thereby losing an important part of 
its actual nature. As the present moment was in no way significant 
in the history of the building, rather the other way around, it could 
be said that Ruskin’s view on objects and their restoration is based 
on the eternalist time model. A building is important in its historic 
wholeness, starting from its creation and reaching into the faraway 
future. An eternalist attitude can also be found in Ruskin’s view 
on geology, the science that sees the history of the Earth as certain 
periods following each other. He writes: “If only the Geologists would 
let me alone, I could do very well, but those dreadful Hammers! I hear 
the clink of them at the end of every cadence of the Bible verses.”28
For Ruskin, the term history was “the recognition of the past” 
rather than history in its classic meaning.29 He understood history 
as a “strange land”: past was always something that a person could 
not understand.30
CONCLUSIONS
Human activity in the world is always related to time and space, both 
providing us with opportunities and setting significant restrictions. 
Heritage and its preservation are no exception. Preservation means the 
27  Ruskin, The Seven Lamps of Architecture, 203.
28  George P. Landow, The Aesthetic and Critical Theories of John Ruskin. See: http://www.
victorianweb.org/authors/ruskin/atheories/4.2.html [viewed 11.01.2017].
29  Thordis Arrhenius, The Fragile Monument – On Conservation and Modernity (London: 
Artifice Books, 2012), 84.
30  Richard L. Syein, “Unstable Foundations: Ruskin and the Costs of Modernity”, Ruskin 
and Modernism, ed. by Giovanni Cianci and Peter Nicholls (Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave, 
2001), 1–16.
215214 Time and Space of Her iTage pr eServaTionKur mo KonSa
documents; however without restoration, the objects would have 
been destroyed and thereby also lost their historic value. However, it 
is possible to find a solution to this dilemma based on the eternalist 
time model, which helps connect heritage to contemporary time, 
and avoid its physical, legal, and mental separation from everyday 
life of society. The fact that considering objects as part of heritage 
could damage them instead of preserving them should also not be 
overlooked. The authenticity of an object is not related to any ideal 
state in its history but to a conceptual, factual and actual state in 
its wholeness.
Ku r m o Ko n sa :  Ti m e a n d spac e of h e r i Tag e p r e s e rvaT ion: 
con s e rvaT ion T h e or e T ic a l p e r sp ec T i v e
K e y wo r d s:  cu lT u r e;  he r i Tag e;  con s e rvaT ion;  r e s T or aT ion; 
me Ta p h ys ic a l Ti m e mo de l s;  violl e T-le-duc;  Joh n ru s k i n
SUMMARY
In this article, I discuss the categories of time and space in light 
of heritage conservation. I demonstrate that heritage creation is 
the simultaneous creation of human time and space and that the 
critical treatment of heritage requires a more specific analysis of 
these terms. First, I look at how the creation of human space occurs 
through objects, and how the objects of the physical environment 
become things, i.e. parts of our living world. The world can only be 
understood through change. This is a fundamental finding that forms 
the basis for both elementary senses and complicated philosophies. 
In order to explain the change in heritage-related space, I am using 
the terms artificialisation and heritage technology. Artificialisation 
means the anthropogenic transformation of the environment, 
which takes place mainly with the help of technological systems. 
Therefore, the environment encompasses physical, biological and 
genetic environments, as well as the human culture with its past. 
In this environment, it is impossible to distinguish between the 
human and non-human, since they make up a single hybrid whole. 
Artificialisation is by no means a determined course in history; it is 
a human means of description, a metaphor that helps to explain the 
processes ongoing in nature and human society. According to this 
approach, the heritage process is one technique in the artificialisation 
of the environment.
Although change is central to conservation theory, it is also a 
concept that causes the greatest doubts and ambiguous interpretations. 
The reason for this is very simple: change is related to time, which 
is a foundational concept. In this article, I use metaphysical time 
models to analyse the life course of things and their damage. Finally, 
I also refer to the conservation theories of Eugène Viollet-le-Duc 
and John Ruskin. The essential difference between the conservation 
theories that are discussed here lies in their attitudes toward time, 
and the related problems of object authenticity and identity. In the 
framework of the presentist model, it is not possible to solve the 
main contradiction connected to restoration. Stylistic restoration 
ruins the authenticity of buildings as historical documents; however 
without restoration, the objects would be destroyed and thereby 
lose their historical value. However, a solution to this dilemma can 
be found based on the eternalist time model, which helps connect 
heritage to contemporary time, and avoid its physical, legal, and 
mental separation from the everyday life of society. The fact that 
including objects as a part of heritage may damage them instead of 
preserving them should not be overlooked. The authenticity of an 
object is not related to any ideal state in its history but to a conceptual, 
factual and actual state in its wholeness.
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